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(Received 27 August 2002; published 6 February 2003)057902-1We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol for an
arbitrary source whose averaged states are basis independent, a condition that is automatically satisfied
if the source is suitably designed. The proof is based on the observation that, to an adversary, the key
extraction process is equivalent to a measurement in the ^x basis performed on a pure ^z-basis
eigenstate. The dependence of the achievable key length on the bit error rate is the same as that
established by Shor and Preskill [Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)] for a perfect source, indicating that
the defects in the source are efficiently detected by the protocol.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.057902 PACS numbers: 03.67.Ddof the BB84 protocol that applies to a setting opposite to
that considered by Mayers: the detector is perfect and
p0;0^0; 0  p0;1^0; 1  p1;0^1; 0  p1;1^1; 1;
(1)Quantum key distribution is an ingenious application
of quantum mechanics, in which two remote parties
(Alice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through
the transmission of quantum signals. In the Bennett-
Brassard (BB84) protocol [1], Alice sends a key bit to
Bob by preparing a qubit in one of two conjugate bases
and Bob measures the qubit in one of the two bases; the
eavesdropper Eve, who does not know the basis chosen
by Alice or by Bob, cannot collect information about the
key without producing a detectable disturbance. This
protocol, when suitably augmented by classical error
correction and privacy amplification, is provably secure
against any attack by Eve [2–5].
Though security can be proven without imposing any
restriction on Eve’s attack (other than the requirement
that she has no a priori information about the basis used),
it is necessary to place conditions on the performance of
the source and detector employed in the protocol. In the
Shor-Preskill proof [5], it is assumed that any flaws in the
source and detector can be absorbed into Eve’s basis-
independent attack. The proof by Mayers [2], however,
applies to a more general setting: although the source is
perfect, the detector has never been tested and is com-
pletely uncharacterized. Indeed, the detector could be
under the control of Eve’s collaborator Fred. Fred is
unable to send messages to Eve, but he knows Bob’s basis
and can adjust the measurement performed by the detec-
tor accordingly. Still, as Mayers showed, Fred cannot fool
Alice and Bob into accepting a key that Eve knows, as
long as the efficiency of the detector is basis independent.
Since a real device could have an indefinite number of
degrees of freedom, no test can fully characterize it;
therefore, proving security in the case of an uncharacter-
ized apparatus provides comfort to a highly suspicious
user of the key distribution scheme.
In this Letter, we present a simple proof of the security0031-9007=03=90(5)=057902(4)$20.00 Fred controls the source. We, however, place one impor-
tant restriction on Fred’s attack—the source must not
leak any information to Eve about the basis chosen by
Alice. That is, the state emitted by the source, averaged
over the values of Alice’s key bit, is required to be
independent of Alice’s basis. Our proof applies to faulty
sources that are notably more general than those encom-
passed by the Shor-Preskill proof; to give just one ex-
ample, it applies to a source that performs perfectly when
Alice chooses the ^x basis but that rotates the qubit when
Alice chooses the ^z basis. Nevertheless, our proof shows
that a secure key can be extracted from a sifted key at the
same rate established by Shor and Preskill.
Our proof combines insights gleaned from both the
Mayers proof and the Shor-Preskill proof. Following
Mayers, we analyze the information about (Bob’s) key
collected by Eve in the case where Alice and Bob are
using different bases. Following Shor and Preskill, we
bound Eve’s information by observing that Bob could
have performed an error correction to remove any entan-
glement with Eve’s probe before executing the measure-
ment that extracts his final key. The core of our proof is
the observation that a single quantum circuit computes
Bob’s final key in the ^x basis and reverses the damage
inflicted by Eve if the error rate is small in the ^z basis.
Using the same method, we can also prove security for
the case of an uncharacterized detector.
Before proceeding to the proof, let us specify in more
detail our models of the source and detector. Alice pre-
pares a physical system with Hilbert space H A, which
has an arbitrary size, in one of four states ^a; g with
probability pa;g; a  0; 1 labels Alice’s basis choice and
g  0; 1 is the value of her key bit. The choice of a is
assumed to be completely random: pa;0  pa;1  1=2. We
assume that the states satisfy2003 The American Physical Society 057902-1
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prepare such an ensemble is to introduce an auxiliary
system A0 with Hilbert space H A0 . Alice first prepares
H A H A0 in an entangled state ^AA0 and then performs
a measurement Ma on system A0 alone. The measurement
Ma gives a binary outcome, determining g. Equation (1)
is then satisfied because the choice of the measure-
ment, M0 or M1, does not affect the marginal state of
H A. Hence, if the source is realized in this way, there
is no need to test its performance.
As noted in [6], if A0 is a qubit, M0 is a measurement of
^z, and M1 is a measurement of ^x, then security can be
established by the method of Shor and Preskill. But our
security proof invokes only the condition (1); no further
properties of ^AA0 , M0, or M1 need be specified.
At the end of the transmission channel H A ! H B,
Bob switches between two measurements on H B. We
assume that the two measurements are modeled by a
common quantum channel H B ! H 2, where dimH 2 
2, followed by the measurement of the Pauli operator ^z
or ^x. In the security proof, we include the common
quantum channel in the transmission channel between
Alice and Bob, so that Bob receives a qubit at the end of
the channel.
The protocol that we shall prove to be secure is the
following: Let 
  f1; . . . ; 4N1 g. The variable de-
noted by a takes the value opposite to a.
Protocol 1 (BB84).—(1) Alice creates random bit se-
quences faig and fgig for i 2 
. Alice randomly chooses a
subset R  
 with size jRj  2N1 . (2) Bob creates
a random bit sequence fbig. (3) When i 2 R, Alice sends
^ai; gi. When i 2 R 
 R, Alice sends ^ ai; gi.
(4) Bob measures ^z when bi  0 and measures ^x when
bi  1. For either case, he sets bit hi according to the
outcome (hi  0 for outcome 1 and hi  1 for outcome
1). (5) Bob announces fbig. Alice announces faig and R.
If the size of T  fi 2 Rjai  big is less than N, the
protocol aborts. Bob decides randomly on a subset S 
fi 2 Rj ai  big with jSj  N and announces (if he can-
not do this, the protocol aborts). (6) Alice and Bob
compare gi and hi for i 2 T and determine the error
rate . If  is too large, the protocol aborts. (7) Bob
randomizes the positions of the N qubits in S by a per-
mutation  and announces . Bob announces a linear
code Cwith jCj  2r that corrects N  errors occur-
ring in random positions with probability exponentially
close to unity. (8) The sifted key sif of length N is
defined as the sequence fhigi2S. The final key is the coset
sif  C?. (9) Alice obtains sif by applying an error
correction scheme to fgigi2S via encrypted communica-
tion with Bob, consuming  bits of the previously shared
secret key. Then Alice obtains the final key.
Protocol 1 is the standard BB84 protocol, except for the
use of ai in place of ai in steps (3) and (5), which we have
adopted for later convenience in the proof. The random
permutation  in step (7) is redundant, since it suffices to
choose the code C randomly instead of doing the permu-
057902-2tation. In the limit of large N, the achievable r=N reaches
1 h [where h  log2 1 log21 ],
and =N in step (9) approaches h, resulting in the rate
of key generation 1 2h.
Our proof uses some basic properties of (classical)
error-correcting codes. The linear code C appearing in
step (7) is an r-dimensional subspace of the binary vector
space FN2 . The code C? appearing in step (8) is the
orthogonal complement of C, called the dual of C. We
can specify a linear coding function G : Fr2 ! FN2 , which
assigns a distinct codeword of C to each binary sequence
of length r. We have assumed in the protocol that C
corrects N  errors occurring in random positions
with probability exponentially close to unity. More spe-
cifically, there exists a set of correctable errors E  FN2
and a decoding function f : FN2 ! Fr2, satisfying
fGy  x  y (2)
for any y 2 Fr2 and any x 2 E. A random error with
weight at most N  belongs to E with probability
exponentially close to unity. The function f is not neces-
sarily linear and may be hard to compute, but we will
need only its existence for the proof of security—Bob
does not compute f in the actual protocol.
What Bob actually calculates is the coset sif  C? in
step (8). One way to do this is to use the function GT :
FN2 ! Fr2, which is the adjoint (matrix transpose) of G
satisfying GTx  y  x  Gy mod2 for any x 2 FN2
and y 2 Fr2. Since the kernel of GTx is C?, the final
key is the r-bit sequence GTsif. The duality between G
and GT will play an important role in the proof below.
In order to prove that protocol 1 is secure, we need to
show that Eve’s maximum knowledge I1 about the final
key is negligible. Note that Bob’s final key is determined
at step (8); step (9), which assures that Alice’s key agrees
with Bob’s and leaks no information to Eve, is not rele-
vant to I1. Let us compare protocol 1 with a modified one.
Protocol 2.—30 When i 2 R, Alice sends ^ai; gi.
When i 2 R, Alice also sends ^ai; gi. The other steps
are the same as in protocol 1.
This modification follows Mayers’s argument [2] ex-
cept for the exchanged roles of the sender and the receiver.
The only difference between protocols 1 and 2 is a flip in
Alice’s basis for i 2 R. But the bits fgig for i 2 R are kept
secret by Alice. Hence, for Eve and Bob only the state
averaged over fgig is relevant, and this state is identical for
the two protocols by the condition Eq. (1). Therefore,
Eve’s maximum knowledge I2 about Bob’s final key in
protocol 2 is the same as I1.
Next, let us further modify protocol 2 in favor of Eve,
by allowing Eve to control Alice’s source. Now Eve
knows faig and fgig and is free to prepare the states
measured by Bob however she pleases. Since the states
^ai; gi have been removed from the protocol and Bob’s
measurements are symmetric in bi, the protocol is com-
pletely symmetric in faig and fgig. Therefore we may057902-2
FIG. 1. (a) A quantum circuit calculating fin  GTsif in
the X basis. (b) The same circuit in the Z basis. When x 2 E,
the final state of system Q is j0iZ.
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ing protocol is as follows.
Protocol 3.—(1) Alice randomly chooses a subset R 

 with size jRj  2N1 . (2) Bob creates a random
bit sequence fbig. (3) Eve prepares Bob’s qubits and her
ancilla system in a state. (4) Bob measures ^z when bi 
0 and measures ^x when bi  1. For either case, he sets
the bit hi according to the outcome. (5) Bob announces
fbig. Alice announces R. If the size of T  fi 2 Rjbi  0g
is less than N, the protocol aborts. Bob decides randomly
on a subset S  fi 2 Rjbi  1g with jSj  N and announ-
ces (if he cannot do this, the protocol aborts). (6) Bob
counts the number n of bits with hi  1 for i 2 T and
determines the error rate   n=jTj. If  is too large, the
protocol aborts. (7) Bob randomizes the positions of theN
qubits in S by a permutation  and announces . Bob
announces a linear code C. (8) The sifted key sif of
length N is defined as fhigi2S. The final key is the coset
sif  C?.
Since the modifications in the protocol favor Eve, Eve’s
maximum knowledge I3 about the final key in protocol 3
is no less than I2: thus I1  I2  I3. To complete the
proof, we will show that I3 is small—Eve cannot predict
Bob’s key accurately because Bob is measuring in the
‘‘wrong’’ basis.
Let us denote the Hilbert space of Eve’s system as H E
and that of the N qubits belonging to S as H S. We may
imagine that Bob’s measurement on set S is delayed until
step (8) and denote by ^ the state over H S H E after
the verification test on the set T is done, but before the
qubits in S are measured. The test on T finds that the rate
of error (^z  1) over N (or more) randomly chosen
qubits is . If the qubits in the set S were also measured in
the z basis, then the joint probability of finding an error
rate less than  in T and finding more than N 
errors in S would be asymptotically less than
exp2N=4 2 for any strategy by Eve. Ignoring
any inefficient strategy that has only an exponentially
small probability of giving an error rate less than  in
T, we conclude that for the state ^, the probability of
finding more than N  errors in S is exponentially
small.
Let fjviZ; v 2 FN2 g denote the ‘‘Z basis’’ of H S, where
the value of the jth bit of v corresponds to the eigenvalue
of ^z on the jth qubit, and let fjviX  H^NjviZg denote the
‘‘X basis,’’ where H^N is the Hadamard transformation
acting on the N qubits. The announcement of  in
step (7) can be described as the transmission from Bob
to Eve of a particle J in one of N! orthogonal states fjiJg.
The symmetrized state held by Bob and Eve after trans-
mission of the particle is
^s  N!1
X

jiJhj  U^  1^E^U^y  1^E: (3)
Let P^E be the projection of H S onto the subspace
spanned by the states jeiZ such that e 2 E. The successful
verification test ensures that the probability of finding an
057902-3error pattern that is not in E is exponentially small:
TrP^E  1^E^s  1 ', where ' is an exponentially
small number. (We are now regarding the particle J as
part of Eve’s system E.) If we define ^0 as
^0  P^E  1^E^sP^E  1^E
TrP^E  1^E^s
; (4)
its fidelity [7] to ^s, F^0; ^s  Tr

^0
p
^s

^0
p 1=22, is
given by
F^0; ^s  TrP^E  1^E^s  1 ': (5)
In what follows, we will show that if the state ^0 instead
of ^s were used, Eve would have no information about the
final key (I3  0). Then we will infer that any actual
strategy by Eve (that passes the verification test with a
probability that is not exponentially small) gives her
exponentially small information.
In protocol 3, Bob measures in the Z basis for the
verification test, and in the X basis to generate the
key—we need to show that if the error rate is low in
the Z basis, then the key is random and private. Our proof
invokes a quantum circuit that outputs the same r-bit final
key as Bob finds in protocol 3, and that also expunges
Eve’s entanglement with the key bits. Though Bob might
not have actually executed this circuit, it would be all the
same to Eve if he had, which is sufficient to ensure
privacy.
The circuit, shown in Fig. 1, uses an auxiliary system Q
of r qubits initially prepared in the state j0iX and is a
composition U^  U^2U^1 of two unitary operators U^1 and
U^2. The operator U^1, which calculates the final key, acts
in the X basis as
U^1 : jxiX  jyiX ! jxiX  jyGTxiX: (6)
Using the duality between G and GT , we easily see that
U1 acts in the Z basis as
U^1 : jxiZ  jyiZ ! jxGyiZ  jyiZ: (7)
The operator U^2 is defined in the Z basis as
U^2 : jxiZ  jyiZ ! jxiZ  jy fxiZ; (8)
and in the X basis acts as
U^2 : jxiX  jyiX ! jx;yiX  jyiX: (9)057902-3
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exact form is not relevant here.
If the initial state of the ancilla Q is j0iX, then from
Eqs. (6) and (9) we have
U^jsifiX  j0iX  jx;finiX  jGTsifiX; (10)
the final key fin  GTsif is obtained by measuring the
system Q in the X basis after execution of the circuit.
Meanwhile, Eqs. (7) and (8) with j0iX /
P
y jyiZ lead to
U^jxiZ  j0iX /
X
y
jxGyiZ  jy fxGyiZ;
(11)
if x 2 E, the final state of Q is j0iZ, due to Eq. (2). Then,
Eq. (4) ensures that if the initial state of H S H E is ^0,
the final marginal state of Q is still j0iZ. Therefore, the
final state ^Q of Q obtained when we start from the actual
state ^s is exponentially close to j0iZ:
Zh0j^Qj0iZ  F^0; ^s  1 ': (12)
Equation (12) establishes that the final key can be
obtained from a complete X-basis measurement on the
state ^Q, whose fidelity to the Z-basis eigenstate j0iZ is
exponentially close to unity. From this, we conclude the
following: (a) The mutual information I3 between the
final key and Eve, who may conduct any measurement
on her system, is upper bounded by the von Neumann
entropy S^Q [8]. Since ^Q has an eigenvalue greater
than or equal to 1 ', we have I1  I3  S^Q 
h'  'log22r  1< h'  r'. (b) The probability
distribution py over the 2r final keys is very close to
uniform. In fact, the fidelity to the uniform distribution
cannot be lower than the fidelity in Eq. (12). Thus we have
2rPy pyp 2  1 '. Using the inequality 2log2x 
r1 x2  1 x2=ln2 which holds for x  2r=2
when r is large, the Shannon entropy of fpyg is bounded
as Hfpyg  r 2
P
y pylog22rpy1=2  r2

1 'p 
1  r1 2'.
The two imperfections of the final key derived in (a)
and (b) can be combined into a single parameter by the
following argument. Let us assume that Bob randomly
chooses and announces a bit sequence w 2 Fr2 and pro-
duces a new key w y which is truly uniformly distrib-
uted. If Eve’s information about y is I1, then her
information about w y is
I  rHfpyg  I1 < 3r' h'; (13)
which is also exponentially small, concluding the proof.
Finally, suppose that Bob uses a detector with imper-
fect efficiency, which has a ‘‘null’’ outcome (signifying a
detection failure) in addition to the valid binary outcome.
Our proof remains valid, provided that the efficiency
(probability of obtaining a valid outcome) is the same
for the two bases, and the size of 
 is increased.057902-4Our proof of security applies to an uncharacterized
source with basis-independent averaged states. By inter-
changing the roles of sender and receiver, the same proof
can be applied to the case of an uncharacterized detector,
considered by Mayers [2]. Indeed, in that case our proof
allows a more general source (one triggered by a perfect
measurement on half of an entangled state, as opposed to
a perfect source) and a higher rate of key generation
[1 2h rather than 1 h  h2] than estab-
lished by Mayers. In either case, by exploiting the duality
between the operation that encodes a message usingC and
the operation that computes a C? coset, our proof illumi-
nates the connection between a low error rate and suc-
cessful privacy amplification.
It is also interesting to consider characterized imper-
fect sources and detectors that have limited basis-
dependent flaws. One important case of a characterized
defective source, recently analyzed in [9], is a source that
occasionally emits two identical copies of a qubit, one of
which can be intercepted by Eve. In this case, our proof
does not apply because Eq. (1) is not satisfied. Security
criteria for characterized sources and detectors are fur-
ther discussed in [10].
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